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1Evaluating Information Security 
Core Human Error Causes (IS-
CHEC) Technique in Public Sector 
and Comparison with the Private 
Sector
Mark Evans, Ying He *, Leandros Maglaras, Iryna Yevseyeva, Helge Janicke 
Cyber Security Centre, De Montfort University, England
Abstract
Background: The numbers of reported public sector information security 
incidents has significantly increased recently which includinges a 22% related 
to the UK health sector. Over two thirds of these incidents pertain to human 
error, but despite this, there are limited published related works researching 
human error as it affects information security. 
Method: This research conducts an empirical case study into the feasibility 
and implementation of the Information Security Core Human Error Causes 
2(IS-CHEC) technique which is an information security adaptation of Human 
Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART). We analysed 12 
months of reported information security incidents for a participating public 
sector organisation providing healthcare services and mapped them to the IS-
CHEC technique.  
Results: The results show that the IS-CHEC technique is applicable to the 
field of information security but identified that the underpinning HEART human 
error probability calculations did not align to the recorded incidents.  The 
paper then proposes adaptation of the IS-CHEC technique based on the 
feedback from users during the implementation. We then compared the 
results against those of a private sector organisation established using the 
same approach.  
Conclusions: The research concluded that the proportions of human error 
isare far higher than previously reported in current literature. The most 
common causes of human error within the participating public sector 
organisation were lack of time for error detection and correction, no obvious 
means of reversing an unintended action and people performing repetitious 
tasks.     
Key words: Information Security, Human Error Assessment and Reduction 
Technique (HEART), Information Security Core Human Error Causes (IS-
CHEC), Human Error Related Information Security Incidents, Human 
Reliability Analysis (HRA)
31. Introduction
The number of incidents reported to the Information Commissioner’s Office 
(ICO) by a number of UK sectors increased significantly from July to 
September 2017 [1] in comparison to published figures for April to June 2017.  
Some of tThese sectors included the health sector which increased by 22% 
and continues to be the sector with the highest percentage of data breaches 
[2], the education sector with an increase of 68% and a staggering increase of 
178% pertaining to the central government sector with a staggering increase 
of 178%.  Within the health sector, the main breach types were data posted or 
faxed to an incorrect recipient, data sent via email to an incorrect recipient 
and loss or theft of paperwork.  Incident reporting is a core component of the 
National Health Service in the United Kingdom [3].  
The NHS Digital Information Security Incident Good Practice Guide [4]  
acknowledges that losses of personal data are damaging to the person 
concerned and the NHS as a whole.  The document and [4] even lists ‘human 
error such as emailing data by mistake’ as an example of an information 
security incident.  However, it within the document [4] it does not expand on 
human error related to the email example above or the probable causes in 
terms of richer information.   and tTherefore there is no published guidance 
within the document on how to understand and prevent human error from 
occurring.  Human errors including slips, lapses and negligence haveas been 
4acknowledged in the literature as common reasons that information security 
incidents occur [5–8]. Organisational data breaches can occur in a number of 
ways with cyber attacks being the most reported form of data breach, but 
malicious insiders and employee negligence being the biggest risk [9].  It is 
expected that the actual volumes and types of breaches will be better known 
and understood from May 2018.  The General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) introduced a duty on all organisations to report personal data related 
breaches and incidents to the ICO within 72 hours of becoming aware of 
themit [9].  This shouldwill result in richer information being published by the 
ICO.
A recent study [10] estimated that there was an average probability of 27.7% 
that organisations participating in the study would suffer a data breach within 
the next 24 months.  It was also presented that the average cost of data 
breaches that were as a result of human error or negligence was $126 per 
record.  It was also established that the mean time to identify a human error 
related data breach was 168 days and the mean time to contain the breach 
was 54 days.
It was recently publishedestablished that UK local authorities suffered in 
excess of 98 million cyber attacks since 2017 [9] which equates to 37 
attempted breaches every minute.  It was also confirmed that at least one in 
four councils experienced an actual security breach in this time.  Cyber 
attacks are designed to exploit humans who are perceived to be the weakest 
cyber security link [9] and it is suggested all local authority staff should have 
5basic cyber security awareness.  This suggestion is very much focused upon 
the mitigation for intentional malicious attacks that exploit humans but does 
not address the issue of underlying non-malicious activityunintentional, human 
error which, that results in the majority of information security incidents and 
breaches [11].  It has been published in our previous work that the majority of 
information security incidents and breaches are as a result of human error but 
that this is in fact the consequence of organisational failings rather than the 
cause [12].
It has been found that many breaches occur due to some form of human error 
[13] and that between April 2011 and April 2014 there were 4,236 UK local 
authority breaches.  These breaches included 628 cases of iIncorrect or 
inappropriate data being shared on emails, letters and faxes, 401 cases of 
data loss or theft, 159 cases of data being shared with a third party, and 99 
cases of unauthorised people accessing or disclosing data. 
This research follows on from our previous research where we applied the IS-
CHEC technique, formerly known as HEART-IS, in the same way to analyse 
the same 12 month period of reported information security incidents within a 
private sector organisation.  The name of the technique was changed upon 
discussion with the original creator of the HEART technique to clearly 
distinguish between the original HEART technique and IS-CHEC, as well as 
intellectual property.
This research conducts an empirical case study into the feasibility and 
implementation of the Information Security Core Human Error Causes (IS-
6CHEC) technique which is an information security adaptation of Human Error 
Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART). We analysed 12 months of 
reported information security incidents for a participating public sector 
organisation and mapped them to the IS-CHEC technique.  This would enable 
us to understand if the IS-CHEC technique is feasible to the public sector in 
terms of information security incident management and associated qualitative 
and quantitative elements, such as the calculated HEART human error 
probability compared to actual incident likelihood.  Finally a comparison of 
results will be undertaken against private sector results [12]. 
This paper makes the following contributions:
 Conducts an empirical case study to investigate the feasibility of 
applying the Information Security Core Human Error Causes (IS-
CHEC) technique within a public sector information security setting for 
the first time in the literature.
 Presents an empirically validated understanding into the proportions 
and causes of human error related information security incidents within 
a public sector organisation.
 Proposes further adaptation of the IS-CHEC technique and tool based 
upon a comparison of case study findings within public and private 
sector organisations.
 Validates the empirical case study results against published public 
sector personal data breaches and incidents.
This paper presents the findings of an empirical case study into the feasibility 
and implementation of the Information Security Core Human Error Causes 
7(IS-CHEC) technique.  The case study comprisesing of a retrospective 
analysis of twelve months of reported information security incidents within a 
public sector participating organisation.  The case study findings will be 
compared to our previous research [12] relating to the same research that 
was undertaken within a private sector organisation.  Following on from our 
previous research [11], this paper forms an element of wider study whereby 
the validated results from the empirical study will form the basis of informed 
likelihood calculations to ensure the predictive element of HEART is 
applicable to the field of information security.  The results of this public sector 
case study and the previous private sector case study enabled us to present 
adaptations to the HEART HRA technique in the form of the IS-CHEC tool 
and technique and tool which is applicable to, and reflects, information 
security practices.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents 
related work. Section 3 details the research method including the case study 
organisation and introduces the IS-CHEC technique.  Sections 4 and 5 
present the IS-CHEC technique and tool utilised to conduct the empirical 
research and proposed adaptations. Sections 6 and 7 present the detailed 
results of the case study and comparison with the private sector.  Sections 8 
and 9 provide the findings, implications of the research, comparison and 
validation against published literature and personal data breaches, 
conclusions and outline planned future work. 
2. Related Work
8Current human factors information security research places an imbalanced 
focus on intentional actions rather than unintentional human error [14].  
Published information systems human behavior related research 
predominantly addresses the problem of intentional violations and non-
compliances [15–39] resulting in proportionally limited work relating to 
unintentional human error [40–42].  Therefore there are limited published 
related works researching human error as it affects information security.  
Published research appears to be be focused on theoretical using techniques 
such aselements and surveys [43] rather than empirical validation based on 
techniques including interviews or action research and case studies as set out 
within our research.  As a result, there are diverse understandings on the 
actual proportion and volumes of incidents relating to human error.  As stated 
in our previous research [11], the majority of incidents pertain to human error 
and this was supported in the empirical research we conducted within a 
private sector organisation [12].  As examples of this, the work presented by 
Hamid et al [44] states that human errors add a  39% contribution to the 
information security incidents experienced by organisations, and Wall [45] 
found that published data suggested that 47% of breaches were due to 
insiders and of this figure 31% related to human error.  We argue that this 
figure is proportionally lower than actual exposure as expressed within this 
paper and previous empirical validation [12].  In support of our research, 
Parsons et al [46] identified as part of their work that human error was a factor 
in 95%5 percent of information security incidents. 
Published works present a general understanding that humans are the 
9weakest information security link [43,46–49], the main threat [48], and that 
human characteristics commonly lead to most information security breaches 
[46,48,50].  Basin, Radomirovic and Schmid [51] emphasise that many 
business practices rely upon humans and that humans are computationally 
weaker than machines as they can be naïve, careless or gullible.  Human 
error related information security incidents can occur where a person is 
completing an intended activity but performs an unintentional action caused 
by human characteristics such as negligence and carelessness [43,48].  
However such incidents can also occur as a result of targeted attacks 
exploiting specific human weakness [49].  Mahfuth et al [48] point out that on 
one hand humans are, and create, threats to an organisation but on the other 
hand are key in protecting against or preventing incidents and breaches.   
Research has identified that an effective information security culture can lead 
to employees acting as a ‘human firewall’ safeguarding information and that 
despite the application of technical security approaches, this is not enough as 
information security is both a technical and people issue [52–54].  For the 
information security community and organisations to focus theirits attention on 
technical measures to protect information without consideration of the human 
factor is inadequate [48].  Information security is primarily a human factors 
problem that remains unaddressed and onas in many occasions organisations 
overlook the human factor [47].    
Detecting and preventing the insider threat and associated risk is complex 
and difficult to mitigate [55].  Insiders reside within organisational defences 
and often have elevated privileges to infrastructure, systems and data [55] 
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and therefore managerial security, as opposed to technical security, is vital 
[50].  In order for an organisation to identify vulnerabilities in its systems or 
processes that could be exploited by humans it is important that they examine 
and understand all possible human error causes [56].
Research has also found that there are gaps in current information security 
practice with regard to the human factor, including behaviour and error which 
have not been explored [44] or given attention within literature [47].  Furnell et 
al [43] stated that people are often not provided with adequate guidance to 
enable effective information security decisions and Hwang and Cha [57] also 
added that for most employees, achieving their own job goal is the priority and 
information security may be a hindrance or even cause conflict.  AlHogail [52] 
indicated that although researchers have addressed the role of human 
behaviour within information security, there is little evidence of the application 
of this knowledge. 
As set out within our earlier work [12], it is essential for the information 
security community to fully understand the types and causes of human error 
in order for it to be treated effectively.  As set out by James Reason [58], 
human error comprises of a number of fundamental elements.  These 
elements include that human error can only be as a result of an intended 
action not achieving their desired outcome, and comprises of a greater degree 
of granularity than is currently applied and published.  A human error could be 
as a result of a slips, (an incorrect action which is associated with a correct 
intention [59]), a lapses, (forgetting to do something, or losing your place 
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midway through a task [60]), or a mistakes, (a failure of intended actions to 
achieve their desired outcome [58]).  Mistakes are then broken down into rule-
based or knowledge-based mistakes.  Rule-based mistakes can occur if an 
incorrect rule is used [61] perhaps as part of an organisational policy or 
procedures, whereas knowledge-based mistakes occur where there is a lack 
of rules or procedures resulting in a human having to make a quick decision 
[61].  All of the above mentioned human error categories could potentially be 
caused by human error relating to people at both the sharp or blunt end but 
they could also be the consequences of organisational deficiencies including 
poor working environment, lack of resources (including time), or a lack of, or 
inadequate, policies and procedures.  It is also set out by Reason [58] that 
different cognitive stages can be applied.  Mistakes would be as a result of the 
planning stage whereas lapses would be as a result of the storage phase and 
slips relate to the execution stage.  Human errors would not include violations, 
defined as deliberately doing the wrong thing.  Reason [62] sets out that the 
human error problem can be viewed as either through the person approach or 
system approaches which has a different model of error causation.  The 
person approach focusses on human fallibility and blames thehem person for 
errors including forgetfulness and inattention. whereas  Alternatively, the 
system approach accepts that humans are fallible and that errors are 
consequences rather than the cause and applies the principle that the human 
condition cannot be changed but the conditions under which humans work 
can.
           
3. Methodology
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3.1 Case Study Organisation
The case study organisation is a public sector organisation which provides 
healthcare services.  It has approximately 2000 employees and provides a 
range of services and its incident management practices are required to 
support compliance with legislation and government guidance.  The 
participating organisation was selected through opportunity and agreement 
with the parent university. Information security is governed centrally by the 
Head of Information Security and their small team who are responsible for the 
development of organisational strategy and policy as well as oversight and 
engagement in all reported incidents. Designated individuals, usually 
managers, within each business area have responsibility for information 
security application in addition to their primary role. These Business area 
representatives are not dedicated information security professionals but 
attend formal governance sessions with the information security team on a bi-
monthly basis.  The organisation has an information security policy as well as 
an information security incident policy and procedures in place which are 
communicated to all employees as part of annual awareness requirements.  
Compliance in terms of awareness are continuously monitored and acted 
upon. 
We conducted an empirical study using the IS-CHEC technique to perform a 
retrospective analysis of recorded information security incidents within the 
participating public sector organisation.  We applied the IS-CHEC technique 
to capture and analyse recorded incidents in order to establish those that 
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related to human errors and if the tasks and associated error producing 
conditions could be mapped and established. The analysis was undertaken 
on all information security incidents recorded between 1st June 2015 and 31st 
May 2016. The case study was a longitude study, which spanned a duration 
of approximately ten months. 
3.2 Case Study Method
In order to conduct the empirical study, the IS-CHEC (Originally called 
HEART - IS) techniquemethod and tool was used as presented in our 
previous study within a private sector organisation [12].  The IS-CHEC 
technique is an adapted version of the HEART technique that is split into two 
elements which can be seen in the appendices.  These are an IS-CHEC 
mapping element and an analysis element.  The mapping element was 
appended to the participating organisation’s incident register to enable all 
recorded incidents to be analysed against HEART in terms of its components 
such as generic task types (GTT) and error producing conditions (EPC).  A 
number of additional fields were also created to enable the collection of 
associated information that we believed would add value to both the research 
andbut also the participating organisation due to gaps in current published 
information security literature.  The added fields enabled us to capture the 
common types of activities and roles associated with incidents which we feel 
are missing in related work and research.  The IS-CHEC analysis element 
was a separate tool from the mapping tool which comprised of a number of 
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fields, which were used in order to allow the HEART in-built likelihood 
calculations to be analysed against actual incident likelihoods.    
4. Implementation of IS-CHEC
The incident data collection, IS-CHEC mapping and analysis, and reporting 
steps were undertaken throughout the course of the case study and are 
expanded upon below.  
4.1 Incident Data Collection 
In order to ensure that the recorded information security incidents for all 
business areas within the participating organisation were validated based 
upon greater local business knowledge, it was essential that local business 
area leads were engaged for each business area.   The retrospective incident 
analysis was performed on 322 incidents reported between 1/6/2015 and 
31/5/2016. 322 (100%) of incidents and mapping data were confirmed as 
being validated by the respective business area leads.  
The next step was to obtain an anonymised incident register securely from the 
participating organisation covering the period from 1st June 2015 to 31st May 
2016 which would be the core data set analysed.  The incident register 
contained basic details of all incidents reported during this period.  
It was also decided as part of the case study to capture the primary element 
of the role being performed that was being undertaken when the incident 
occurred.  The participating organisations were provided with the primary 
element of the role options below:
 Administration
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 Communications
 Computer End User
 Data Entry
 Filing
 Email User
 Human Resources
 IT Support
 Line Manager
 Mobile Phone User
 Mobile Computer User
 Mobile Computing Device User
 Senior Management
 Remote/Home Worker
 Document or Equipment Destruction
4.2 Implementing the IS-CHEC mapping element
The IS-CHEC mapping element, as shown in table A2 with in the appendices, 
was originally presented in our private sector research [12] and comprised of 
core HEART components such as GTT, EPC and Associated Proportion of 
Affect (APOA) to enable the population of associated HEART data and 
associated research analysis.  An amendment from the standard HEART 
approach was to utilise the use of percentages rather than decimals to 
capture the APOA for each EPC as it was felt that this would aid 
understanding due to literature stating a weakness of HEART is the subjective 
nature of determining the APOA [63].  We provided the tool to each business 
area representative to enable them to establish required HEART data for each 
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reported incident to address previous literature which stated that assessors 
found the population of the APOA difficult.
In accordance with the HEART User Manual [59], a conservative approach 
was applied.  This approach only includes only an EPC if it definitely was a 
factor in the incident occurring and also utilising a lowest defined value for the 
APOA. In order to enable accurate probabilistic calculations to be obtained, 
the participating organisation was only able to select up to a maximum of 3 
EPCs for each incident.
4.3 Implementing the IS-CHEC analysis element
The intention of the IS-CHEC analysis element [12] was to enable data 
analysis of the inbuilt HEART likelihood calculations.  The IS-CHEC analysis 
element captured HEART in-built values including the nominal, lower and 
higher unreliability bounds associated with each GTT, the strength of each 
identified EPC, automated calculation fields to determine the nominal 
likelihood of failure, and also fields to capture actual numbers of incidents in 
order to determine the actual likelihood of incidents that were experienced by 
the organisation.
We fully populated the IS-CHEC analysis element based upon the data 
provided by the participating organisation.  In addition, it was necessary to 
review all reported incidents and group them to understand the actual number 
of times that a specific type of incident occurred in order to ascertain actual 
frequency of occurrence.  This included understanding the tasks and activities 
that were being performed as well as reviewing the incident description to 
establish the volumes of repeated incidents.
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4.4 Final data analysis and reporting
Finally the complete IS-CHEC data set was analysed manually and through 
use of IBM SPSS software.  Once the analysis was completed, a report was 
compiled for the participating organisation in order for them to have sight of 
the full results of the feasibility study.  The details of which the results are 
included within the results analysis section of this article.
5. Adaptation of IS-CHEC
It was found that the HEART GTT descriptions contained not only the type of 
task but also the environmental context.  Therefore, in order to make the 
incident mapping consistent, the GTTs were mapped to the captured specific 
tasks and renamed to General Information Security Affecting Tasks (GISAT).  
Therefore, people capturing incident data can easily map the incident to a 
specific task such as sending an email rather than distinguishing between 
complex GTT descriptions.  The mapping can be seen in table 1.  Following 
analysis of wider incident data published by the ICO, two further GISATs were 
recorded relating to faxing of information and sharing in person to ensure the 
technique and tool are comprehensive.
18
GISAT HEART 
GTT 
Mapping
Mapping based on 
retrospective incident 
analysis within private 
and public sector 
organisations
GISAT1- Sending an email G A, D, G
GISAT2 - Entering, updating or 
deleting data within a system, file or 
document
D B, D, E, F, G, H
GISAT3 - Posting an item or 
information
E E, G
GISAT4 - Configuring a system B B, D, F
GISAT5 - Administering a system D B, D, E
GISAT6 - Scanning a document E E
GISAT7 - Printing a document E B
GISAT8 - Providing information 
verbally
G D, E, G
GISAT9 - Delivering information or 
equipment
D D
GISAT10 - Filing or sorting information E B, D, E, G
GISAT11 - Reading or checking an 
email, file, document or item
G -
GISAT12 - Safeguarding information or D A, D, E, M
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GISAT HEART 
GTT 
Mapping
Mapping based on 
retrospective incident 
analysis within private 
and public sector 
organisations
equipment
GISAT13 – Destroying information or 
equipment
D D
GISAT14 – Accessing a location or 
environment
G D, E, G
GISAT15 – Faxing information E -
GISAT16 - Sharing or handing over 
information or equipment in person
G -
Table 1 – Mapping of IS-CHEC General Information Security Tasks (GISAT) 
to HEART GTTs 
Next, in order to aid understanding by all involved in the investigation of 
human error information security incident causes, the term Error Producing 
Condition (EPC) has been changed to Core Human Error Cause (CHEC).  
Two additional CHECs have been added.  These relate to little or no self-
checking or testing of output as identified in our previous research [12] and 
also a lack of significant job aids as captured within HEART GTT G.  
In order to support greater understanding and usability in relation to the 
APOA, the naming convention was again amended to become the CHEC 
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Weighting or Significance (WoS).  Also, in order to address the issue of users 
‘over scoring’ the HEART APOA the graphical rating scale, ranges and rules 
set out in table 2 are applied to the IS-CHEC technique to prevent weighting 
exceeding 1.0.
WoS Graphical Rating 
Scale
WoS Ranges and Rules
1.0
Entirely the cause of 
the error
0.9
0.8
0.7
Significant cause of 
the error
0.6
0.5
Moderate cause of the 
error
0.4
0.3
0.2
Insignificant cause of 
the error
0.1
Most significant CHEC WoS 
Range: 0 - 1.0
Second most significant CHEC 
WoS 
Range : 1.0 minus Primary CHEC 
WoS
Rule: Cannot exceed Primary 
CHEC WoS
Least significant CHEC WoS
Range: 1.0 minus (Primary CHEC 
WoS + Secondary CHEC WoS)
Rule: Cannot exceed Secondary 
CHEC WoS
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WoS Graphical Rating 
Scale
WoS Ranges and Rules
0
Not a cause of the 
error
Table 2 – CHEC Weighting or Significance (WoS)
The IS-CHEC model to be applied to information security incident 
management is presented in figure 1.  This is a lower-level adaptation of the 
plan-do-study-act model presented in our previous research [11].
Figure 1 – IS-CHEC Incident Management Model
6. Results
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The following sections of the report present the findings of the retrospective 
incident analysis for the participating public sector organisation.
6.1 General Results
The participating organisation analysis identified that 298 (92.5%) of the 322 
reported and validated incidents were due to human error as shown in table 3.  
This is in line with the volumes presented by Parsons et al [46].
Due to Human Error 
(y/n)
N Y Total
Organisation Area M 2 3 5
Organisation Area N 1 1 2
Organisation Area O 0 8 8
Organisation Area P 0 3 3
Organisation Area Q 7 12 19
Organisation Area R 3 41 44
Organisation Area S 0 1 1
Organisation Area T 3 80 83
Organisation Area U 1 25 26
Organisation Area V 0 3 3
Organisation Area W 0 75 75
Organisation Area X 7 43 50
Organisation Area Y 0 2 2
Organisation 
Area
Organisation Area Z 0 1 1
Total 24 298 322
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Table 3 – Human error related incidents
256 incidents (87.7%) of the validated human error related incidents within the 
participating organisation were due to commission.  This provides a picture 
that the vast majority of human errors are as a result of a slip or lapse, 
whereby the person that the human error relates to performed a task but did 
so incorrectly rather than the incident occurring due to them not performing a 
task.
The most common primary elements of roles associated with human error 
related information security incidents within the public sector organisation 
were communications and administration.  
Primary Element of the Role Frequency
Administration 54
Communications 67
Computer End User 50
Data Entry 11
Document or Equipment Destruction 4
Email User 19
Filing 40
Human Resources 2
IT Support 27
Line Manager 14
Mobile Phone User 7
Total 295
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Table 4 – Primary element of the role that is pertinent to the incident/human 
error
The most common specific activities that led to the incidents within the 
participating organisation were Sending an Email – 76 (25.5%), Posting 
Documents – 69 (23.2%), Data Filing – 52 (17.4%), and IT System 
Configuration, Administration, Development or Support – 22 (7.4%). 
Specific Activity Count
Accessing server room 1
Administration 1
Clearing screen of previous information 1
Communications to employer (post) 1
Communications to Service Desk (email) 34
Communications to sService Pprovider (post) 1
Communications to service users (phone) 1
Communications to service users (post) 14
Configuration of proxy services 1
CV Pprocedure 1
Data entry or modification 4
Data Ffiling 23
Data Ffiling - records update 11
Data filing - scanning 13
Data filing - scanning documents using reference numbers 5
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Specific Activity Count
Destruction of documents 4
Document Mmanagement - Sservice Uuser Vverification 1
ID pass management 1
Instigate leavers procedure 7
IT Ssupport 2
IT Ssystem Aadministration 4
IT Ssystem Cconfiguration 10
IT Uuser 1
Leavers procedure 7
Manual correction of system reference number 1
Password reset 1
Password Ssecurity and Mmanagement 5
Placing a document in an envelope 23
Posting documents 53
Printing of documents 1
Publication of user guides 1
Raising leavers form 3
Recording caller details 1
Recording Sservice Uuser Ddetails 1
Safeguarding company equipment 7
Sending an email 42
System coding 1
Systems Ddevelopment 3
26
Specific Activity Count
Update of records 3
Use of IT Ssystem - Ppassword Ssharing 1
User was providing training to a client organisation 1
N/a - not task related 1
Total 298
Table 5 - Specific activity being performed that led to the incident/human error
6.2 Error Producing Condition results
The most common primary, secondary and tertiary EPCs within the 
participating organisation can be seen in Table 6.
Error Producing Condition Primary 
EPC 
Count
Secondary 
EPC 
Count
Tertiary 
EPC 
Count
1 EPC 2 - A shortage of time available 
for error detection and correction
141 4 1
2 EPC 7 - No obvious means of 
reversing an unintended action
74 3 0
3 EPC 11 - Ambiguity in the required 
performance standards
31 7 0
4 EPC 17 - Little or no independent 
checking or testing of output
15 16 10
5 EPC 1 - Unfamiliarity with a situation 1 0 0
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Error Producing Condition Primary 
EPC 
Count
Secondary 
EPC 
Count
Tertiary 
EPC 
Count
which is potentially important but 
which only occurs infrequently or 
which is novel
6 EPC 12 - A mismatch between 
perceived and real risk
9 15 1
7 EPC 32 - Inconsistency of meaning of 
displays and procedures
4 0 0
8 EPC 6 - A mismatch between an 
operator’s model of the world and that 
imagined by a designer
2 0 0
9 EPC 25 - Unclear allocation of 
function and responsibility
2 0 0
10 EPC 10 - The need to transfer specific 
knowledge from task to task without 
loss
1 0 0
11 EPC 13 - Poor, ambiguous or ill-
matched system feedback
1 0 0
12 EPC 15 - Operator inexperience (e.g. 
a newly-qualified tradesman, but not 
an “expert”)
1 0 0
13 EPC 16 - An impoverished quality of 
information conveyed by procedures 
1 14 1
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Error Producing Condition Primary 
EPC 
Count
Secondary 
EPC 
Count
Tertiary 
EPC 
Count
and person/person interaction
14 EPC 21 - An incentive to use other 
more dangerous procedures
1 0 0
15 EPC 23 - Unreliable instrumentation 
(enough that it is noticed)
1 0 0
16 EPC 26 - No obvious way to keep 
track of progress during an activity
1 1 0
17 EPC 34 - Prolonged inactivity or 
highly repetitious cycling of low 
mental workload tasks
0 66 4
18 EPC 3 - A low signal-noise ratio 0 57 0
Table 6 – Primary, secondary and tertiary EPCs
Finally the primary (most impacting), secondary and tertiary (least impacting) 
EPCs were totalled to give an overall view in the respective organisations as 
to the volume of EPCs selected that had a definite contributing factor to the 
information or cyber security incidents occurring.  The results for the 
participating organisation are shown in table 7.
Error Producing Condition Count
1 EPC 2 - A shortage of time available for error detection and correction 146
2 EPC 7 - No obvious means of reversing an unintended action 77
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Error Producing Condition Count
3 EPC 34 - Prolonged inactivity or highly repetitious cycling of low 
mental workload tasks
70
4 EPC 3 - A low signal-noise ratio 57
5 EPC 17 - Little or no independent checking or testing of output 41
6 EPC 11 - Ambiguity in the required performance standards 38
7 EPC 12 - A mismatch between perceived and real risk 25
8 EPC 16 - An impoverished quality of information conveyed by 
procedures and person/person interaction
16
9 EPC 32 - Inconsistency of meaning of displays and procedures 4
10 EPC 6 - A mismatch between an operator’s model of the world and 
that imagined by a designer
2
11 EPC 25 - Unclear allocation of function and responsibility 2
12 EPC 26 - No obvious way to keep track of progress during an activity 2
13 EPC 1 - Unfamiliarity with a situation which is potentially important but 
which only occurs infrequently or which is novel
1
14 EPC 10 - The need to transfer specific knowledge from task to task 
without loss
1
15 EPC 13 - Poor, ambiguous or ill-matched system feedback 1
16 EPC 15 - Operator inexperience (e.g. a newly-qualified tradesman, but 
not an “expert”)
1
17 EPC 21 - An incentive to use other more dangerous procedures 1
18 EPC 23 - Unreliable instrumentation (enough that it is noticed) 1
Table 7 – Total count of all EPCs identified
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The results show that athe significant proportion of human error related 
incidents were due to a shortage of time available for error detection and 
correction, which was a factor in 61% of the reported human error related 
incidents.  The results also indicate that there is an obligation for 
organisations to ensure employees are given opportunity to reverse or stop an 
unintended action.  The organisations should also ensure that they are 
consciously aware of people processing confidential information whilst 
performing repetitious tasks.
6.3 Generic Task Type results
The most common GTT was E followed by D as shown in table 8.  GTT E and 
D accounted for 89.9% of the reported and validated human error related 
incidents showing that reported incidents tended to relate to routine and 
simple tasks.  Within the participating organisation, GTT M, a miscellaneous 
task selected if one of the other available GTTs did not appear to be relevant, 
was only selected 4 times from within 298 reported and validated human error 
related incidents.  This supportsing the claim that HEART is an applicable tool 
within and information security setting. 
Generic task type Count
1 GTT E - Routine, highly-practised, rapid task involving relatively 
low level of skill 
169
2 GTT D - Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given scant 
attention 
99
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Generic task type Count
3 GTT B - Shift or restore system to a new or original state on a 
single attempt without supervision or procedures 
20
4 GTT M - Miscellaneous task for which no description can be found 4
5 GTT A - Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no real idea of 
likely consequences
3
6 GTT F - Restore or shift a system to original or new state 
following procedures, with some checking 
1
7 GTT G - Completely familiar, well-designed, highly practised, 
routine task occurring several times per hour, performed to 
highest possible standards by highly-motivated, highly trained and 
experienced person, totally aware of implications of failure, with 
time to correct potential error, but without the benefit of significant 
job aids
1
8 GTT H - Respond correctly to system command even when there 
is an augmented or automated supervisory system providing 
accurate interpretation of system state
1
9 GTT C - Complex task requiring high level of comprehension and 
skill
0
Table 8 – Generic Task Types
6.4 Statistical data results
In total there were 103 of the 322 private sector incidents which contained the 
required data to establish both the predicted and actual likelihood of reported 
incidents.  The statistical data presented in Table 9, utilising mean averages 
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to three decimal places of the attained results for each GTT, indicates that the 
inbuilt HEART calculations do not align to the reported information security 
incidents due to the fact that the average actual likelihood was lower than the 
average nominal likelihood of failure in all cases.  
Generic 
Task 
Type 
Count of 
validated 
incidents
Average 
Nominal 
Likelihood of 
Failure
Average 
Nominal 
Likelihood of 
Failure Lower 
Bound
Average 
Nominal 
Likelihood of 
Failure Upper 
Bound
Average 
Actual 
Likelihood
GTT A 0     
GTT B 13 2.533 1.364392308 4.092176923 0.013278107
GTT C 0     
GTT D 55 0.727679025 0.485452684 1.05049808155 0.021062002
GTT E 31 0.193299355 0.068754774 0.43423548 0.00548064
GTT F 0     
GTT G 1 0.0044 0.001088 0.077 0.001096154
GTT M 3 0.330 0.088 1.210 0.015495726
  Table 9 – Public sector predicted and actual likelihoods
7. Comparison with private sector results
Although it was proved in both public and private sector organisations that the 
majority of reported security incidents related to human error, there was a 
large difference in the percentages of human error.  The private sector 
organisation recorded 51% of information security incidents as being due to 
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human error whereas the public sector organisation was 92.5%.  A key 
difference between the organisations was the establishment of embedded 
information security policy across the whole public sector organisation as well 
as established and consistent incident reporting procedures.  As the same 
level of information security incident management was not present across the 
much larger private sector organisation it is conceivable that not all 
information security incidents were reported to the central function despite 
.both organisations leveraging definitions based upon ISO27001 [64] in order 
to define what constitutes an information security incident within policy.  
  
One of the key general findings based upon comparison of the public and 
private sector organisations was the number of respective human error 
related incidents that pertained to omission or commission.  Both 
organisations independently presented very similar findings.  256 (87.7%) of 
incidents within the public sector organisation and 84 incidents (90.3%) within 
the private sector organisation were due to commission.  The percentages 
were very similar in both participating organisations (difference of 2.6%) 
showing that consistently incidents occur due to people performing a task 
incorrectly rather than not performing a task.
In addition to the direct mapping of recorded incidents to the HEART HRA 
technique, a number of other data elements were captured as it was felt that 
this could provide useful insight for this research and subsequent research.  
Therefore, it was decided to capture the job titles for each human error related 
incident to establish any trends or patterns.  Very similar results were 
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ascertained from both participating organisations.  The results showed that 
the vast majority of incidents pertained to administrative roles where there 
was a requirement to complete high volumes of repetitive tasks involving 
personal or confidential data.
The main similarity with both participating organisations was that 
‘administration’ was the second most common primary element.  It should be 
noted that both organisations have different business processes so this 
cannot be deemed a direct comparison but is useful information within their 
respective organisations.  Another type of data captured during the case study 
outside of the direct mapping to HEART was identifying the tasks, processes 
or activities being performed that led to the incident occurring.  There were no 
relationships identified between the organisations.  Within the private sector 
organisation the most common tasks or processes were safekeeping of 
company materials and service setup, .  Wwhereas the most common within 
the public sector organisation were postal and email communications.
The next section focusses upon the direct mapping of all recorded incidents to 
the 38 EPC’sEPCs within the HEART HRA method [12].  EPC 38, age of 
personnel performing perceptual tasks requiring the ability to interpret or 
become aware of something through the senses (sight, hearing, taste, smell 
or touch), was not used within the public sector organisation as it was felt by 
the organisation that this could be perceived as discriminatory and could not 
be acted upon.  The private sector organisation did not request that EPC 38 
be omitted.    For each incident recorded, the respective business area 
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representative was required to select only EPC’sEPCs which definitely had an 
impact on the incident occurring.  The business area representative was able 
to select from zero to a maximum of three EPC’sEPCs for each incident.  
Error Producing Condition Primary 
EPC 
Count
Secondary 
EPC 
Count
Tertiary 
EPC 
Count
1 EPC 2 - A shortage of time available 
for error detection and correction
43 1 7
2 EPC 16 - An impoverished quality of 
information conveyed by procedures 
and person/person interaction
12 0 0
3 EPC 7 - No obvious means of 
reversing an unintended action
11 11 0
4 EPC 1 - Unfamiliarity with a situation 
which is potentially important but 
which only occurs infrequently or 
which is novel
4 0 1
5 EPC 11 - Ambiguity in the required 
performance standards
4 10 0
6 EPC 3 - A low signal-noise ratio 3 0 0
7 EPC 17 - Little or no independent 
checking or testing of output
3 0 1
Table 10 – Private sector organisation primary, secondary and tertiary EPCs
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There was correlation witnessed with both organisations identifying that EPC 
2, referring to a shortage of time available for error detection and correction, 
was the most common primary EPC, and reason that it was felt the human 
error occurred which resulted in an information security incident.  There was 
no relationship identified between the participating organisations with regard 
to the secondary EPC’sEPCs captured.  A relationship was identified with 
regard to the tertiary EPC’sEPCs selected by both participating organisations 
as both selected EPC 2 and 7.  
Finally the primary, secondary and tertiary EPC’sEPCs were totalled to give 
an overall view in the respective organisations as to the volume of 
EPC’sEPCs selected that had a definite contributing factor to the information 
security incidents occurring.
Error Producing Condition Count
1 EPC 2 - A shortage of time available for error detection and correction 51
2 EPC 7 - No obvious means of reversing an unintended action 22
3 EPC 11 - Ambiguity in the required performance standards 14
4 EPC 16 - An impoverished quality of information conveyed by 
procedures and person/person interaction 
12
5 EPC 1 - Unfamiliarity with a situation which is potentially important but 
which only occurs infrequently or which is novel  
5
6 EPC 17 - Little or no independent checking or testing of output 4
7 EPC 3 - A low signal-noise ratio 3
Table 11 – Private sector organisation total count of all EPCs identified
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Therefore the significant proportion of human error related incidents were due 
to a shortage of time to perform the intended task.  There was a strong 
correlation between public and private sector organisations.  The most 
common two EPC’sEPCs were the same for both organisations (2 and 7) and 
of the most common seven EPC’sEPCs, both organisations had five that 
matched (2, 3, 7, 11, 17).
  
In terms of statistical comparison between the public and private sector 
organisations, the research has found correlations.  The organisations could 
statistically be compared against GTTs B, D, E and G as they were selected 
by both organisations.  The private sector average nominal HEART likelihood 
and average actual likelihood can be seen in table 12.
Generic 
Task 
Type 
Count of 
validated 
incidents
Average 
Nominal 
Likelihood of 
Failure
Average 
Nominal 
Likelihood of 
Failure Lower 
Bound
Average 
Nominal 
Likelihood of 
Failure Upper 
Bound
Average 
Actual 
Likelihood
GTT A 1 4.950 3.150 8.730 0.0065769
GTT B 2 0.74988 0.4032 1.2096210 0.0021603
GTT C 0
GTT D 35 0.243071 0.162047 0.351102 0.0109688
GTT E 2 0.0687508 0.0243628 0.1521893 0.004327
GTT F 3 0.124375 0.033 0.289875 0.160258
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Generic 
Task 
Type 
Count of 
validated 
incidents
Average 
Nominal 
Likelihood of 
Failure
Average 
Nominal 
Likelihood of 
Failure Lower 
Bound
Average 
Nominal 
Likelihood of 
Failure Upper 
Bound
Average 
Actual 
Likelihood
GTT G 39 0.004462 0.0010892 0.078077 0.000089
GTT M 0
  Table 12 – Private sector predicted and actual likelihoods
Within both organisations the average actual likelihood was lower than the 
average HEART nominal lower bound in all cases with the exception of GTT 
G for the public sector organisation and GTT F for the private sector 
organisation.  However, there wasere only 1 public sector incident mapped to 
GTT G and 3 private sector incidents mapped to GTT F. 
8. Discussion
8.1 Principle findings
Our research has found that the majority of incidents within the participating 
public sector organisation relate to human error.  The research findings of the 
empirical case study  has identified that the actual proportion of reported 
public sector information security incidents within the participating 
organisation that relate to human error was 92.5%.  Also analysis of published 
incidents and breaches indicates that the proportion of UK public sector 
personal data human error related breaches is probably in excess of 96% 
[65].
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The empirical research has found that the IS-CHEC technique is feasible for 
use for analysis of information security incidents within a public sector 
organisation from a qualitative perspective as all recorded human error 
related incidents were able to be mapped to the HEART GTTs and EPCs.  
However, from a quantitative perspective the HEART nominal likelihood lower 
bound calculations did not mirror, and were lower than, the actual likelihood of 
recorded incidents as with the exception of GTT G within the public sector 
organisation and GTT F within the private sector organisation.    
8.2 Implications of the findings
Following this empirical study, further improvements to the IS-CHEC 
technique have been identified to enable greater applicability within the 
information security environment.  These improvements relate to the in-built 
HEART component weightings in order to enable alignment between 
calculated and actual incident likelihoods.  The presented improvements also 
relate to the usability of the IS-CHEC technique by people not experienced or 
qualified in human factor engineering.  The research has also introduced 
positive implications for the participating public sector organisation in that they 
now have a detailed understanding of the main causes of their reported 
information security incidents.  This detailed research has subsequently 
enabled the organisation to increase its information security resourcing and 
formally embed the IS-CHEC technique within their incident practices to 
actively address information security related human error on an ongoing 
basis.      
40
8.3 Comparison with the literature
As presented within the related work section of the paper there is a diverse 
range of understanding relating to the proportions of human error related 
information security incidents.  However, the actual volumes of human error 
related information security incidents are roughly in line with the pParsons [46] 
who claimed that 95% percent of incidents related to human error.  The public 
sector organisation studies as part of this research found that 92.5% of 
incidents were human error related.  
8.4 Validation against published public sector personal data breaches
In addition to the empirical case study, an analysis of published personal data 
breaches was performed [65] in order to obtain external validation of our 
results.   The sources of this external validation were the ICO data breach 
trends website [66] and also the published NHS serious incidents requiring 
investigation (SIRI) 2 relating to Q3 2017 [67].  It was found that it human 
error was involved in possibly 96% of breaches and incidents for central 
government and 98% for local government and health sectors [65].
 
8.5 Limitations of the method
Some expected and unexpected limitations of the method were experienced 
which mirrored our research undertaken with a private sector organisation 
[12].  This included the retrospective assessment of the previously reported 
incidents.  This activity required significant effort by the respective business 
area representatives to ascertain accurate facts and resulted in the mapping 
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of all incidents against the IS-CHEC tool taking considerably longer than 
intended.  The mapping completion was undertaken over a period of ten 
months.  
In addition, the public sector empirical case study and similarly the private 
case study both found that the information security leads tended not to weight 
the APOA in a pessimistic manner, as required by the HEART technique.  
Due to the use of percentages they were subconsciously aiming for the 
combined EPCs to total 100% despite this requirement being presented and 
documented within population procedures.  This was not an expected 
limitation but has provided good information to enable further enhancement of 
the IS-CHEC tool.   
Another unexpected limitation was the fact that the public sector organisation 
made a decision to exclude EPC 38 (Age of personnel performing perceptual 
tasks requiring the ability to interpret or become aware of something through 
the senses (sight, hearing, taste, smell or touch)) as it was felt that this could 
be perceived as discriminatory and could not be acted upon.
9. Conclusions and Future Work
Based on the findings presented after analysis oif the two case studies in 
public and private [12] sector organisations, it can be concluded that the 
proportions of human error are far higher than previously reported in most of 
the accepted literature.  The research has concluded that the actual 
empirically tested validated volumes of human error information security 
incidents are very high and certainly aligning to the few empirical case studies 
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previously published in literature [46].   The participating public sector 
organisation established that 92.5% of its recorded information security 
incidents related to human error.  There was a large difference in the numbers 
of reported information security incidents and also the percentages of human 
error related incidents recorded between the public (92.5%) and private (51%) 
sector organisations.  A key difference between the organisations was the 
level of established information security maturity in terms of embedded policy, 
governance and procedures across the both entire organisations.  The public 
sector organisation had established information security incident practices 
and governance whereas the private sector organisation only mirrored this in 
business areas that were required to meet external security standards.   
Therefore, future research should ascertain the impact organisational 
information security maturity has upon the reporting, recording and 
understanding of information security incidents. 
The empirical study has found that the most common cause of human error 
that led to an information security incident within the participating public sector 
organisation was a lack of time for error detection and correction.  This 
matches the findings from the equivalent research undertaken with a private 
sector organisation [12].  The second and third most common causes of 
human error were that there are no obvious means of reversing an 
unintended action and people performing repetitious tasks.      
 
Based upon the research undertaken, there are a number of further 
enhancements that can be made to the IS-CHEC technique and tool.  These 
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include supporting general understanding outside of the human factors 
community.  Therefore, the terms used to describe the core HEART 
components are amended within the IS-CHEC technique.  In addition, it is 
proposed that the GTT be mapped to specific tasks such as sending an email 
so that users can easily map tasks without having to understand terms which 
are not easily distinguishable.  It is also proposed that the IS-CHEC nominal 
likelihood calculations be recalibrated following real-time analysis of 
information security incidents.  
Wider analysis of public sector security personal data incidents and breaches 
by the UK Information Commissioner’s OfficeICO reinforces this view and 
provides data that suggests that that the proportion of personal data breaches 
across the public sector is even higher still and in excess of 96% [65].  This 
wider analysis provides insight in that across private and public sectors the 
proportions of human error related personal data breaches are in excess of 
90%.
Future work is planned to undertake a real-time six month action research 
cycle within both public and private sector organisations in parallel.  This 
action research will apply the IS-CHEC technique and also begin to research 
the reduction element of the technique.  This is intended to establish if the 
technique can be utilised to capture detailed information on human error 
related information security incidents and have a positive impact in terms of 
reducing and preventing human error related information security incidents.
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Summary Points
What was already known on the topic
 Volumes of information security incidents were increasing
 Reported information security incidents included those which related to 
human error although the proportions were unknown
 There is a lack of information security focus on human error unlike 
other fields such as the safety field
What this study added to our knowledge
 It has been empirically established that human error proportions are 
higher than currently understood in the literature
 The majority of information security incidents pertain to human error 
and use of the IS-CHEC technique provides insight into the common 
causes of human error 
 The IS-CHEC technique, as an information security adaptation of 
HEART, is applicable to the field of information security
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Appendices
Appendix A – IS-CHEC Mapping and Analysis Elements
Field Description
Due to Human Error 
(y/n)
Establish if the incident is as a result of human error.
If not human error, 
is it human factor? 
(y/n)
If not due to human error is related to human factor.  For 
example, due to malicious intent.
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Field Description
Specific activity 
being performed 
that led to the 
incident/human 
error
Establish the exact activity that was being performed such as 
sending an email, posting a document or updating a system.
Name of task or 
process being 
performed that led 
to the incident
As HEART is task based, the task associated with the 
incident is identified.
Time of day that the 
incident occurred
Based on recent amendments to HEART, ‘Time of Day’ has 
been added.
Number of times 
per week the task is 
performed
Capture frequency of task in order to compare with HEART 
probabilities.  
Job title/role of the 
person the error 
pertains to
Capture the role related to this incident which has been 
deemed to be able to affect information security.
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Field Description
Primary element of 
the role that is 
pertinent to the 
incident/human 
error
Identify the primary element of the role which led to this 
incident.  The options made available are:
 Administration
 Communications
 Computer End User
 Data Entry
 Filing
 Email User
 Human Resources
 IT Support
 Line Manager
 Mobile Phone User
 Mobile Computer User
 Senior Management
 Remote/Home Worker
 Document or Equipment Destruction
Other primary 
element of the role 
that is pertinent to 
the incident/human 
error
Opportunity to identify if another option is required other than 
those provided in the field above.
Error of commission 
or omission?
Capture if the incident as a result of not performing an activity 
or performing an activity incorrectly.
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Field Description
Generic task Type 
(GTT)
Generic task type within HEART that is applicable to the task 
being performed which resulted in the incident.
GTT Other (y/n) Identify if there is no GTT within HEART which is applicable 
to this incident.
GTT Other Title Select a title for a new information security GTT.
Primary Error 
Producing 
Condition (EPC)
Primary error producing condition that caused the incident.
% Primary EPC 
Assessed 
Proportion of Affect 
(APOA)
The assessed proportion of effect the EPC had on this 
incident (%).
Secondary Error 
Producing 
Condition (EPC)
Secondary error producing condition that caused the incident.
% Secondary EPC 
Assessed 
Proportion of Affect 
(APOA)
The assessed proportion of effect the EPC had on this 
incident (%).
Tertiary Error 
Producing 
Condition (EPC)
Tertiary error producing condition that caused the incident.
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Field Description
% Tertiary EPC 
Assessed 
Proportion of Affect 
(APOA)
The assessed proportion of effect the EPC had on this 
incident (%).
EPC Other (y/n) Identify if there is no EPC within HEART which is applicable 
to this incident.
EPC Other Title Select a title for a new information security EPC.
Data Validated Establish if the data submitted could be confirmed as being 
validated by the researcher and participating organisation.
Table A1 – IS-CHEC mapping element
Field Description
Nominal 
Unreliability
In-built HEART nominal unreliability associated with each 
GTT.
Nominal 
Unreliability Lower 
Bound
In-built HEART nominal unreliability lowest value within the 
techniques range associated with each GTT.
Nominal 
Unreliability Upper 
Bound
In-built HEART nominal unreliability highest value within the 
techniques range associated with each GTT.
Primary EPC  
APOA Decimal
Convert the recorded percentage to a decimal to enable 
calculations to be performed.
Primary EPC  
Strength
In-built HEART value/strength assigned to each EPC
59
Field Description
Secondary EPC  
APOA Decimal
Convert the recorded percentage to a decimal to enable 
calculations to be performed.
Secondary EPC  
Strength
In-built HEART value/strength assigned to each EPC
Tertiary EPC  
APOA Decimal
Convert the recorded percentage to a decimal to enable 
calculations to be performed.
Tertiary EPC  
Strength
In-built HEART value/strength assigned to each EPC
Primary EPC 
Assessed Affect
In-built HEART Calculation establishing the effect of each 
identified EPC.  Calculation uses the EPC strength and 
APOA.
=(Primary EPC Strength-1)*Primary EPC APOA Decimal+1
Secondary EPC 
Assessed Affect
In-built HEART Calculation establishing the effect of each 
identified EPC.  Calculation uses the EPC strength and 
APOA.
Tertiary EPC 
Assessed Affect
In-built HEART Calculation establishing the effect of each 
identified EPC.  Calculation uses the EPC strength and 
APOA.
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Field Description
Nominal Likelihood 
of Failure
Nominal probability that is employed to characterise the 
general likelihood of task failure based on the in-built HEART 
calculation.
=Nominal Unreliability*Primary EPC Assessed 
Affect*Secondary EPC Assessed Affect*Tertiary EPC 
Assessed Affect
Nominal Likelihood 
of Failure Lower 
Bound
Nominal lowest value probability based on the HEART ranges 
that is employed to characterise the general likelihood of task 
failure based on the in-built HEART calculation.
=Nominal Unreliability Lower Bound*Primary EPC Assessed 
Affect*Secondary EPC Assessed Affect*Tertiary EPC 
Assessed Affect
Nominal Likelihood 
of Failure Upper 
Bound
Nominal highest value probability based on the HEART 
ranges that is employed to characterise the general likelihood 
of task failure based on the in-built HEART calculation.
=Nominal Unreliability Upper Bound*Primary EPC Assessed 
Affect*Secondary EPC Assessed Affect*Tertiary EPC 
Assessed Affect
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Field Description
Number of times 
the task is 
performed per 
annum
Number of times that the particular task that was being 
performed and led to the incident is performed each year.
=Number of times per week the task is performed *52
Number of reported 
incidents
Number times this particular type of incident occurred in a 
year.  The population of this field is completed manually 
based on review of all incidents.
Actual Likelihood Calculation based upon the number of times the task is 
performed and the recorded number of incidents in a year.
=Number of reported incidents/Number of times the task is 
performed per annum
Actual Likelihood 
Calculated (Y/N)
Confirmation that all required data has been captured to 
enable the actual likelihood to be calculated.
Table A2 – IS-CHEC analysis element
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SUMMARY TABLE
What was already known on the topic
 Volumes of information security incidents were increasing in Healthcare
 Reported information security incidents included those which related to 
human error although the proportions were unknown
 There is a lack of information security focus on human error unlike other 
fields such as the safety field
What this study added to our knowledge
 This study has empirically established that human error proportions are higher 
than currently understood in the literature
 The majority of information security incidents pertain to human error and use 
of IS-CHEC provides insight into the common causes of human error 
 IS-CHEC, as an information security adaptation of HEART, is applicable to 
the field of information security in a participating public sector organisation 
providing healthcare services
